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social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing, that 
is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits.  The 
model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific 
exclusive content available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers.  
As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where 
its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing.  The analysis thus can have 
important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is 
prevalent.  
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I. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and 
social welfare in network industries when consumers can engage in multi-homing, that is, 
consumers can participate in multiple platforms (or purchase multiple products) in order to 
reap maximal network benefits.  The paper is partly motivated by the recent antitrust cases 
concerning Microsoft.  In the European case, for instance, it has been alleged that the 
company’s tying practice of requiring Windows operating system users to accept its 
Windows Media Player software is anti-competitive and hurts digital media rivals such as 
RealNetworks.1  However, multi-homing is common in digital media systems. Many users 
have more than one media player and many content providers offer content in more than one 
format, which counteracts the tendency towards tipping and the lock-in effects in industries 
with network effects.   
To analyze the effects of tying in markets such as digital media, I adopt the 
framework of platform competition in two-sided markets.  The defining characteristic of 
two-sided markets is indirect network effects or inter-group network externalities that arise 
through improved opportunities to trade with the other side of the market.  In the digital 
media case, content providers and final consumers constitute the two sides that trade with 
each other.  For instance, as more content is available in streaming media the more valuable 
media player programs become, and vice versa.  Other prominent examples of economic 
importance include auction sites such as eBay and Yahoo where buyers and sellers get 
together to consummate a deal, credit card payment systems such as Visa and MasterCard 
                                                 
1 On March 24, 2004, the European Union ruled that Microsoft is guilty of abusing the "near-monopoly" of its 
Windows PC operating system and fined it a record 497 million euros ($613 million).  The case is being 
appealed by Microsoft.   
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where both merchants and consumers need to participate in the same system, video game 
platforms such as PlayStation, X-box and GameCube where game developers and 
consumers constitute the two distinct sides, etc.2  In such markets, the need to get all sides 
of the market to get on board creates a so-called “chicken and egg” problem (Caillaud and 
Jullien, 2003) in that members of each group are willing to participate in the market only if 
they expect many members from the other side to participate.  The literature on multi-sided 
markets is mainly concerned with the optimal pricing structure to coordinate the demands of 
distinct groups of customers who need each other in some way.3    
More recently, the importance of studying antitrust issues in two-sided markets has 
been recognized by several authors.  Evans (2003) and Wright (2003), for instance, provide 
a general discussion on antitrust policy in two-sided markets and call for caution in applying 
the traditional one-sided logic to two-sided markets in the antitrust arena.  However, their 
discussion is mainly informal and does not deal with tying arrangements.   Rochet and 
Tirole (2003b) is a notable exception in the analysis of tying in two-sided markets.  They 
provide an economic analysis of the tying practice initiated by payments card associations 
Visa and MasterCard in which merchants who accept their credit cards were forced also to 
accept their debit cards.4  They show that in the absence of tying, the interchange fee 
                                                 
2 See Evans (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003a) for more examples of multi-sided markets. 
3 See Armstrong (forthcoming) and Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (forthcoming). 
4 This tie-in practice, the so-called “honor-all-cards” rule, has been challenged recently by major merchants 
including Walmart in a class action suit. In the class action suit on behalf of thousands of retailers, the stores 
argued that Visa and MasterCard unfairly required merchants to accept their debit cards, which require a 
customer's signature to verify a transaction, to exclude PIN-based on-line debit cards.  The case was originally 
filed in 1996.  Since then, it was certified as a class action in February of 2000. The trial was set to commence 
on April 28, 2003, following the defendants' unsuccessful appeals of the class-certification decision and 
supplementation of summary judgment motions.   However, Visa and MasterCard each separately agreed to 
settle the antitrust lawsuit brought against them.  Under the settlements, Visa is set to pay $2.025 billion to 
merchants over the next 10 years and MasterCard is set to pay $1.025 billion over the same period. They also 
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between the merchant’s and the cardholder’s banks on debit is too low and tends to be too 
high on credit compared to the social optimum.  Tying is shown to be a mechanism to 
rebalance the interchange fee structure and raise social welfare.  Their model, however, is 
tailored to analyze the payment card industry and the recent antitrust suit involving Visa and 
MasterCard.  In particular, the analysis focuses on tying by a non-profit association to 
reflect the status of credit card associations.  
I show that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-
specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content 
providers.  As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in 
cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing.  The analysis 
thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases and suggests caution in 
applying the traditional theory of network effects and tipping to markets where multi-
homing is prevalent. 
This paper is also closely related to the literature on the “leverage theory” of tying.  
According to the "leverage theory" of tying, a two-product firm with monopoly power in 
one market can monopolize a second market using the leverage provided by its monopoly 
power in the first market.  Whinston (1990), for instance, shows that if the market structure 
in the tied good market is oligopolistic and scale economies are present, tying can be an 
effective and profitable strategy to alter market structure by making continued operation 
unprofitable for tied good rivals.  It is important to keep in mind, however, that in 
Whinston’s basic model inducing the exit of the rival firm is essential for the profitability of 
                                                                                                                                                      
agreed to drop its "honor all cards" policy, which will allow retailers to accept its credit cards without also 
accepting debit cards. 
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tying arrangements.5  Thus, if the competitor has already paid the sunk cost of entry and 
there is no avoidable fixed cost, tying cannot be a profitable strategy.6  Choi and Stefanadis 
(2001) extend the analysis by investigating implications of tying for innovation incentives.  
They show that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in systems markets 
consisting of complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry 
less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating.7   
Carlton & Waldman [2002] are especially worth mentioning in relation to this paper.  
They investigate how the tying of complementary products can be used to preserve and 
create monopoly positions.  Their analysis focuses on two mechanisms through which tying 
can be used in an anticompetitive way: entry costs and network externalities.  In particular, 
their model with network externalities shows that the presence of network externalities for 
the complementary good can result in the strategic use of tying to deter entry into the 
primary market.  The nature of network effects in their paper, however, is direct and thus 
does not explicitly accounts for the peculiarities of two-sided markets.  In addition, none of 
these papers in the tying literature, however, take into consideration the possibility of multi-
homing seriously in the analysis.  Carlton and Waldman (2002), for instance, assume that “if 
a consumer purchases a tied good consisting of one unit of the monopolist’s primary good 
and one unit of its complementary good, then the consumer cannot add a unit of the 
                                                 
5 Whinston (1990) points out that if the heterogeneity of consumer preferences are allowed for the tying good, 
tying can also serve as a price discriminating device and exclusion of the rival firm is not necessary for the 
profitability of tying.  See also Carbajo et al. (1990).   
6 Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidman (1990) and Chen (1997) provide an alternative theory of strategic bundling 
in which bundling plays the role of a product-differentiation device.   As in this paper, bundling does not 
require the exit of the rival firm to be profitable.  However, bundling is used to segment the market and relax 
competition.   
7 In related papers, Choi (1996, 2004) demonstrates that even in the absence of exit by the rival firm, bundling 
can be a profitable strategy via its long-term effects on competition through innovation. 
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alternative producer’s complementary good to the system (italics added, p. 199).”  In other 
words, either they do not allow the possibility of multi-homing or multi-homing does not 
arise in equilibrium.  
Doganoglu and Wright (2006a) explicitly consider multi-homing as a way to reap 
greater network benefits and analyze its implications for price competition.  Their focus, 
however, is on the question of whether multi-homing can be a substitute for compatibility.  
In contrast, my focus is on the effects of tying on competition in the presence of multi-
homing.  Currently, formal economic analysis of tying that explicitly accounts for the 
possibility of multi-homing is virtually non-existent.  The analysis in the paper intends to fill 
this gap in the literature and can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in 
industries where multi-homing is prevalent. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way.  In section II, I set 
up a basic model of two-sided markets.  In section III, I analyze the effects of tying 
arrangements on competition in two-sided markets in the absence of multi-homing.  Section 
IV considers the possibility of multi-homing in the analysis of tying.  Concluding remarks 
follow.   
 
II. The Basic Model of Two-Sided Markets 
In this section, I lay out a very simple model of two-sided markets and derive the 
market outcome in the absence of tying and multi-homing.  The model is a modification of 
the framework developed by Armstrong (forthcoming) and Rochet and Tirole (2003a).  The 
analysis in this section will be used as a benchmark to investigate the effects of tying in two-
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sided platform markets in section III.  In section IV, I will modify the model to account for 
the possibility of multi-homing. 
The model consists of three classes of agents. There are two distinct types of 
customer groups who interact with each other and intermediaries who provide platforms to 
enable these two customer groups to “meet” each other.  In the example of streaming multi-
media players, the two customer groups can be described as content providers and 
consumers who download content through the Internet. There are currently three major 
platform providers: Real Networks, Microsoft and Apple.  In my model, these 
software/platform providers can be considered as the intermediaries who compete in two-
sided platform businesses.   
 Let me assume that there are two intermediaries indexed by i =A, B.   For 
concreteness, let me label the two customer groups as content providers and consumers as in 
the streaming media industry.  The two intermediaries compete for market share within each 
group.  Let pi and qi denote intermediary i’s charge to content providers and consumers, 
respectively, where i =A, B.   The intermediaries’ costs of serving each content provider and 
final consumer are given by c and d, respectively.  Finally, the number of content providers 
and consumers who participate in platform i are denoted by mi and ni, respectively.  As in 
Armstrong (forthcoming), I consider a situation in which at least one side of the market is 
characterized by exclusive intermediation.  More specifically, I assume that final consumers 
“single-home,” that is, they participate in only one platform.   
  
II.1. Content Providers 
I assume that there is free entry in the market for content provision.  Content 
providers are heterogeneous in their fixed cost of creating content, which is denoted as θ.  
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The content providers incur this cost twice if they multi-home, i.e., make their content 
available in digital form on both platforms.  I normalize the number of potential content 
providers to 1 and let F(θ) be the distribution function for θ.    
Each content provider gains additional utility (profit) of π from each consumer who 
has access to her content.  The profit for content providers who create content on platform i 
is given by π ni − pi − θ  when her fixed cost of creating content is θ  and the number of final 
consumers who participate in platform i is ni.   A type- θ content provider is willing to create 
content for platform i if θ < π ni − pi Thus, the number of content providers on platform i is 
given by: 
 mi = F(πni − pi)      (1)    
This implies that the larger the number of consumers participating in platform i is, the 
greater the amount of content that  will be provided on that platform. 
 
II.2.  Consumers 
To analyze the consumers’ choice of platform, I adopt the Hotelling model of 
product differentiation.   I assume that two platforms, A and B, are located at the two 
extreme points of a line with length equal to 1.   Consumers, whose size is normalized to 1, 
are uniformly distributed along the line.  Each consumer’s utility of participating in a 
platform depends on the number of content providers on the same platform.  More 
specifically, the availability of each additional content provider generates additional utility 
of b.  Consumers are also allowed to multi-home, but it will be shown later that they will 
choose to participate in only one platform.  If a consumer located at point x participates in 
platform A, his utility is given by b mA − qA − tx while his utility from participating in 
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platform B is given by b mB − qB − t(1− x).   Assuming that the consumer market is covered, 
this specification implies that the number of consumers participating in platforms A and B 
are, respectively, given by: 
      nA = 
1 ( ) (
2 2
A B A Bb m m q q
t
− − −+ )  and nB = 1− nA = 1 ( ) (
2 2
B A B Ab m m q q
t
)− − −+   (2) 
 
II.3. Platform Competition without Tying 
 Platforms compete in prices to attract consumers in both sides of the market.  Each 
intermediary i’s objective function is given by: 
,i ip q
Max  mi (pi − c) + ni (qi − d),        (3) 
where mA and nA are jointly determined by equations (1) and (2). 
I mainly focus on the symmetric equilibrium in this model.  To derive the symmetric 
equilibrium price for content providers, pA = pB = p*, let me consider a situation where each 
platform intermediary has market share of ½ in the consumer side of the market (nA = nB = 
½) and offers consumers the utility of u = b mi − qi (gross of transportation costs).   Now 
consider an intermediary’s profit maximization problem given this utility u , maintaining 
u = b mi − qi constant.  Then by substituting ni = ½ and qi = b mi − u , intermediary i’s profit 
can be written as: 
Πi = mi (pi − c) + 12 ( b mi − u  − d) 
     = F( 1
2
π − pi) (pi − c) + 1
2
[ b F( 1
2
π − pi) − u  − d ]   (4) 
The first order condition with respect to pi yields: 
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− F′( 1
2
π − pi) (pi − c) + F( 1
2
π − pi) − 1
2
 b F′ ( 1
2
π − pi) = 0   (5) 
The (symmetric) equilibrium price for content providers is thus given by 
  p* = c − 1
2
 b + 1η ,       (6) 
where η = 
1'( *)
2
1( *
2
F p
F p
π
π
−
− )
 can be considered as a measure of the price elasticity of content 
supply.  
 In deriving the symmetric equilibrium price for final consumers, qA = qB = q*, I first 
note a one-to-one relationship between qi and ni from equation (2), given the rival 
intermediary’s price for final consumers qj , where i = A, B, and j ≠  i. 
 qi = qj + t ( 1− 2ni) + b[F(πni − p*) − F(π(1−ni) − p*)]   (7) 
It turns out to be more convenient to treat ni as a control variable for intermediary i in the 
consumer side of the market.   
in
Max Πi = mi (p* − c) + ni ( qi  − d) = F(πni − p*) (p* − c)  
+ ni {qj + t ( 1- 2ni) + b[F(πni − p*) − F(π(1−ni) − p*)]  − d }  (8) 
The first order condition with respect to ni yields:  
π F′(πni − p*)  (p* − c) + {qj + t ( 1− 2ni) + b[F(πni − p*) − F(π(1−ni) − p*)]  − d }  
+ ni{− 2t + b π [F′(πni − p*) + F′(π(1−ni) − p*)] }= 0  (9) 
At the symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition (9) is satisfied at ni = 1/2.  This 
implies that the symmetric equilibrium price  qA = qB = q* can be characterized as: 
 q* = d + t − π F′( 1
2
π − p*) [b + p* − c]     (10) 
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Using equation (6), the symmetric equilibrium price  q* can be written as 
 q* = (d + t) − π F − 1
2
 bπF′       (11), 
which can be interpreted as the standard Hotelling price (d + t) adjusted by two terms 
representing inter-group network externalities in the two-sided markets.  The first term (πF) 
represents direct inter-group externalities that an additional consumer bestows on content 
providers.  The second term ( 1
2
bπF′) represents the indirect inter-group externalities that an 
additional consumer gives to other existing consumers through the feedback process through 
which additional content is provided.    
 
II.4. Socially Optimal Outcome  
In this subsection, I conduct a welfare analysis in which I derive the socially optimal 
outcome and compare it with the market equilibrium.  Under the Hotelling model with the 
assumption of a covered market on the consumer side, social welfare depends only on the 
price for content providers (pi) that affects the amount of content provided in the market.  
With the symmetric outcome, social welfare as a function of the price for content providers 
(p1 = p2 = p) can be written as: 
 W = 2(p − c) F( 1
2
π − p) + bF( 1
2
π − p) + 2[
1
2
0
1( )
2
p
p dF
π
( )π θ θ− − −∫ ] + 2[ 120 txdx∫ ]   (12) 
The first order condition with respect to p yields the following socially optimal price for 
content providers: 
  1
2
op c= − b         (13) 
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The socially optimal outcome thus requires below cost pricing for content providers to take 
into account of their positive externalities to consumers. 
 
III. An Analysis of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Single-Homing Consumers 
 To analyze the effects of tying on competition in two-sided markets, I assume that 
intermediary A is also a monopolist in a related market called M with unit production cost of 
cM.  More specifically, to reflect circumstances in the antitrust case against Microsoft 
concerning the tie-in of Media Player with the Windows operating system, assume that the 
good/service M in the monopolized market (operating systems) is necessary for consumers 
to participate in the two-sided market (streaming multi-media) analyzed in this paper. All 
final consumers have valuation of  v (> cM) for product M.   It is assumed that entry into 
market M is not feasible.8   
 I consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, firm A (the monopolistic 
supplier of product M) decides whether or not to tie the two products.  A price game ensues 
in the second stage with the tying decision in the previous stage taken as given.  The timing 
assumption reflects the fact that the tying decision through product design is a longer term 
decision that cannot be modified easily compared to the price decision.  The outcomes are 
described below and depend on firm A’s tying decision in the first stage. 
 
III.1. No Tying 
 If the two products are not bundled, let me assume that consumers buy product M 
prior to participating in the two-sided market since M is essential for the latter activity.  Due 
                                                 
8 Firm 1 may have a patent or have an installed base that makes entry unprofitable in the presence of switching 
costs or network externalities (Farrell and Klemperer, 2001). 
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to the essentialness of product M, the monopolist can extract consumer surplus from 
participating in the two-sided market.  Let u *= b m*− q* (gross of transportation costs) be 
the equilibrium utility offered in the two-sided market.  Assume further that (v − cM) is 
sufficiently large that it is in best interest of firm M to cover the market.  The consumer who 
has the lowest surplus is the one located in the middle of the line whose surplus is given by 
u *− 
2
t .  The monopolist will charge the price of v + u *− 
2
t .   In the two-sided market I 
am interested in, the analysis in the previous section applies. 
 
III.2. Tying 
 Suppose that the monopolist bundles the two products and charges a price of %Aq  for 
the bundled product on the consumer side.9  I assume that v (> cM) is sufficiently large that 
firm A will price the bundled good so that every final consumer purchases it.   With n A = 1, 
the number of content providers on platform A then is given by F(π − °Ap ) when the tying 
firm charges content providers °Ap .  This implies that the bundled good price is set at the 
price such that the final consumer located at x =1 gets zero surplus: 
 %Aq  = v +  b F(π − °Ap  )  − t       (15) 
The tying firm’s profit maximization problem can be written as: 
°
Ap
Max ΠA = mA ( °Ap  − c) + nA ( %Aq  − d)  
  = F(π − °Ap ) ( °Ap  − c)  + [v + b F(π − °Ap  )  − t − d]  
 (16) 
                                                 
9 Variables corresponding to tying are denoted with a tilde. 
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The first order condition with respect to °Ap  is given by 
− F′(π − °Ap )( °Ap  − c) + F(π − °Ap ) − b F′(π − °Ap ) = 0   (17) 
Thus, the equilibrium bundle price for final consumers ( %Aq *) and the price for content 
providers under tying ( °Ap *) are characterized as: 
  °Ap * =  c − b + %
1
η , where 
%η  = °°
'( *)
( *
A
A
F p
F p
π
π
−
− )  and  
%
Aq * = v +  b F(π − °Ap * )  − t  (18) 
 
III.3. Welfare Analysis 
 In this subsection, I compare the market outcomes under tying and no tying and 
provide a welfare analysis.  There are three channels through which tying can affect social 
welfare due to the monopolization of both sides of the market.   First, all consumers 
patronize the tying firm’s platform.  This implies that there is less variety in the market.  As 
a result, there are less desirable matches between the consumers and platforms, leading to 
higher overall “transportation costs.” Second, content is provided only on the tying firm’s 
platform, whereas the same content was produced on both platforms in the absence of tying.  
Thus, there are savings in duplication costs under tying.  Third, the number of entrants in the 
content side of the market that determines the availability of content can differ across 
regimes.   The first effect is negative while the second effect is positive.  The sign of the 
third effect is ambiguous.  The coordination of consumers on the tying firm’s platform 
enhances the incentive to enter the content side of the market.  However, the tying firm’s 
pricing decision in that side of the market can offset this positive effect.   
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 To conduct a more explicit welfare analysis, I will analyze the effect of tying 
assuming that θ is uniformly distributed on [0,1].  With the uniform distribution, it can 
easily be verified from equations (6) and (18) that  
 p* = 
2 4 4
c b π− + , °Ap * =  2 2 2
c b π− +        
This implies that the number of content providers under each regime is given by: 
 m* = F( 1
2
π −  p*) = 
4 4 2
b cπ + −       (19) 
 ° *Am = F(π −  °Ap *) = 2 2 2
b cπ + −       (20) 
Thus, in the case of the uniform distribution, there is more variety of content available with 
tying ( ° *Am > m*).  
 To explore the welfare implications of tying, I note that welfare under tying can be 
written as: 
  °W = ( °Ap *  − c) F(π − °Ap *) + bF(π − °Ap *) + [
°
°
*
0
( *) (
Ap
Ap dF
π
)π θ θ− − −∫ 10 txdx∫] + [ ] 
With the uniform distribution, it can be verified that social welfare under each regime are 
given by: 
W = 23 ( 2 )
16 4
tb cπ + − − , °W  = 23 ( )
8 2
tb cπ + − −      
Thus, the social welfare change due to tying can be written as: 
 ∆W = °W − W = 2 23 [( ) 2 ]
16 4
tb cπ + − −      (21) 
The result thus suggests that the welfare implications of tying depend on the relative 
magnitude of inter-group externalities (π and b) and the extent of product differentiation.  If 
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the extent of inter-group externalities (π and b) is significant compared to that of product 
differentiation (t), tying can be welfare-enhancing since the benefit from internalizing the 
inter-group network externalities outweighs the loss of product variety.  Otherwise, tying 
reduces welfare.  
 
IV. Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Both Sides Multi-Homing 
 The analysis above considers situations in which the consumer side of the market is 
characterized by exclusive intermediation.  However, this assumption is at odds with the 
prevailing condition in many two-sided markets such as the digital media and the payment 
card industries.  In the digital media case, many users have more than one media player and 
many content providers offer content in more than one format.  The payment card portrays a 
similar picture with consumers carrying more than one payment card and merchants 
accepting multiple payment cards.  In this section, I modify the basic model to explicitly 
analyze the possibility of multi-homing on both sides.    
 
IV.1. Content Providers 
In the previous sections, I assumed that there is free entry in the market for content 
provision and did not make a distinction on whether content available across platforms is the 
same or different.  With the assumption of single-homing by consumers, all that matters for 
consumers is the amount of content available for each platform.  However, once multi-
homing is allowed on the consumer side, it makes a difference; in the symmetric 
equilibrium with the same amount of content available for each platform, consumers would 
not have any incentive to multi-home and the equilibrium identified in section II continues 
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to be an equilibrium even if multi-homing is allowed on the consumer side as long as the 
same content (not just the same amount) is provided across the platforms.  However, if the 
content is different across the platforms, the previous equilibrium may not survive with the 
possibility of multi-homing on the consumer side.    
In order to make the possibility of multi-homing on the consumer side play a role, 
assume that there are two types of content available.  One type of content is more suitable 
for one of the two platforms (formats) whereas the other type of content is suitable for both 
formats.  To simplify the analysis, let me assume that when content is of the first type, that 
is, it is more suitable for one of the two formats, it is not economically feasible to encode in 
the other format.   More specifically, the total measure of content potentially available for 
each format is normalized to 1.  Among them, the proportion λ is of the first type and thus 
can be encoded only for a particular format whereas (1−λ) can also be encoded in the other 
format.  The existence of exclusive content available for each format creates incentive for 
consumers to multi-home.  When the second type of content is encoded for both formats, 
content providers are said to multi-home.   
 
IV.2.  Consumers 
The consumer side of the market is the same as in the previous sections.  The only 
modification is that consumers are now allowed to multi-home.  As a result, there are three 
choices for consumers, assuming that the market is covered as before.  Consumers can 
choose to either single-home or multi-home.  If they decide to single-home, they choose one 
of the two platforms in which to participate in.  
 
IV.3. Market Equilibrium in the Two-Sided Market  with Multi-Homing  
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I am interested in an equilibrium in which both content providers and consumers 
multi-home.  Imagine a situation in which each platform has available exclusive content of 
measure λ and nonexclusive content of measure (1−λ).  In other words, the nonexclusive 
content is available for both formats.  Consider a consumer located closer to platform A who 
would thus choose to participate in platform A in a symmetric equilibrium if he chooses 
only one platform.  Now I analyze the consumer’s incentive to multi-home, that is, to 
participate in platform B in addition to A.      
If a consumer located at point x participates in platform A, his utility is given by 
= b m( , )A AU q x A − qA − tx as before.  With the assumption that  mA =1, I have = b 
− q
( , )A AU q x
A − tx .  If the consumer multi-homes, his utility is given by = b m − q( , , )AB A BU q q x A 
− tx  − qB − t(1-x), where m is the total amount of content available to consumers who multi-
home.  Since each platform has duplicative content of measure (1−λ), I have m = 1+λ.  As a 
result, the utility from multi-homing is given by = b (1+λ) − (q( , , )AB A BU q q x A + qB ) − t.   
The location of the consumer who is indifferent between single-homing A and multi-homing 
is given by:  
x = 1 − Bb q
t
λ −         
Similarly, the location of the consumer who is indifferent between single-homing B and 
multi-homing is given by: 
y = Ab q
t
λ −  
This implies that the number of consumers who single-home platform i is as follows (see 
Figure 1). 
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  = 1 − in jb qt
λ −
 , where i = A, B and j ≠ i.     (22) 
The number of consumers who multi-home is given by 
  Mn  = y – x = 
2 ( ) 1A Bb q q
t
λ − + −      (23) 
Let AN  and  denote the total number of consumers who participate in platform A 
and B, respectively.  Then, we have  
BN
 
AN = y = An + Mn = A
b q
t
λ − , = 1 – x = + BN Bn Mn = Bb qt
λ −   (24)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
Ax n=
B 
1 1 By n= −0 
A 
BNAN  
            A Only                 Consumers Who Multi-Home            B Only 
                               Figure 1. The Choice of Consumers 
 
On the content provider side, the incentives to participate in each platform depend on 
the configuration of consumers on the other side of the market.  Let me assume a situation in 
which the consumer side market is covered and some consumers multi-home, that is, AN + 
 > 1 with BN Mn (= AN +  − 1 ) multi-homing consumers.  Exclusive content for 
platform A will be provided if πN
BN
A − pA ≥ 0.  For nonexclusive content, the incentives to 
encode in format A depend on whether the same content is provided for the other format.  If 
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it is already provided for format B, the condition for a content provider to multi-home, that 
is, to encode in duplicative format A is given by πnA − pA ≥ 0.   With multi-homing on the 
consumer side, NA > nA.  This implies that platform A can either charge πNA  and attract only 
λ exclusive content providers or charge πnA  and attract both exclusive and nonexclusive 
content providers. 
Let me analyze platform A’s profit maximization problem assuming that it serves 
both exclusive and nonexclusive content providers with nonexclusive content providers 
multi-homing.  Conditions for such behavior to constitute an equilibrium will be derived 
later.  In such a case, we have  = 1 − An Bb qt
λ −  .  Notice that with consumers multi-
homing, the number of consumers single-homing A ( ) depends only on the other 
platform’s price charged to consumers (q
An
B).  Thus, the optimal price for platform A on the 
content provider side depends on  qB under the configuration I consider, and is given by  
pA* = πnA = π (1 − Bb q
t
λ − )       (25) 
This implies that under the configuration in which both consumers and content providers 
multi-home, each platform’s optimal price for each side is independent of the other.   
On the consumer side, platform A solves the following problem:  
Aq
Max  ( qA  − d) NA = ( qA  − d) Ab qt
λ −      (26) 
Thus, the optimal price on the consumer side is given by  
qi* = 
2
b dλ + , i = A, B      (27) 
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The optimal price on the consumer side implies that NA = NB  = 
2
b d
t
λ − .  For this to be 
consistent with the consumer side multi-homing, we need NA + NB  >1, that is, b d tλ − > , 
which I assume to hold: 
A1. b d tλ − >  
This condition means that for multi-homing to occur on the consumer side, the amount of 
exclusive content and the network benefits for consumers should be sufficiently high 
compared to the cost and “transportation” parameters.   
In addition, for the multi-homing configuration postulated above to constitute an 
equilibrium, I need to have πni  > λ πNi , that is, attracting both exclusive and nonexclusive 
content providers yields a higher payoff for platforms than attracting only exclusive content 
providers.  With the equilibrium price of qi* = 
2
b dλ +  on the consumer side, I have ni  = 
2 ( )
2
t b d
t
λ− −  and Ni  = 
2
b d
t
λ − .  Thus, the condition can be written as follows: 
A2. (1 )( )
2
b d tλ λ+ − <  
 I assume that both A1 and A2 hold in the remainder of the paper. 
 
IV.2. Tying  
As in the previous section, I assume that v (> cM) is sufficiently large that firm A will 
price the bundled good so that every final consumer purchases it.   Given that every 
consumer has product A, I analyze incentives for consumers to multi-home, that is, to 
participate in platform B in addition to A.  Given that all consumers already have A, 
nonexclusive content providers have less incentive to decode the content in duplicate for 
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format B.  I thus consider an equilibrium in which all nonexclusive content is provided only 
for platform A.  For multi-homing to take place under tying on the consumer side, it is 
necessary that exclusive content for platform B be provided.  When there exists λ amount of 
exclusive content for platform B, the additional benefit of multi-homing for a consumer 
located at x from platform B is given by bλ  − tx.   This implies that the number of multi-
homing consumers is given by Mn% = = BN% B
b q
t
λ − % , where  is the price charged to 
consumers by platform B.   The maximum price platform B can charge to content providers 
when 
Bq%
Mn% =  consumers multi-home is BN% *Bp% = π .  As a result,  platform B’s profit 
maximization is given by: 
BN%
        
Bq
Max
%
 λ(π  − c) + (  BN% Bq%  − d)  = λ(π BN% Bb qt
λ − %  − c) + (  Bq%  − d) Bb qt
λ − %   (28) 
The first order condition for the above problem yields 
   = *Bq%
( )
2
b dλ π− +        (29) 
The number of consumers who participate in platform B and thus multi-home is given by 
  *=BN% Mn% * = 
( )
2
b
t
dλ π+ −       (30) 
 
IV.3. Welfare Analysis  
 To explore the welfare implications of tying, I note that welfare under no tying and 
tying can be written as: 
W =  (1+ Mn λ) b − (1+ Mn ) d −  [
1
0
BN
txdx
−∫ + 10 AN txdx−∫ + Mn t ]  
  + [λ ( AN + ) + (1−λ)]π − 2 c,      (31) BN
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where NA = NB  = 
2
b d
t
λ −  and Mn = 1b dt
λ − −  
°W  =  (1+ Mn% λ) b − (1+ Mn% ) d −  [ + 
1
0
Mn
txdx
−∫ % Mn% t ]  
  + [λ (1+ ) + (1−λ)]π − (1+λ) c,     (32) BN%
where Mn% = = BN%
( )
2
b d
t
λ π+ −  
Thus, the social welfare change due to tying can be written as: 
∆W = °W − W = ( Mn% − Mn )[[λ (π + b)  −d)]  + (1 −λ) c  
  − {[ + 1
0
Mn
txdx
−∫ % Mn% t ] − [ + + 10 BN txdx−∫ 10 AN txdx−∫ Mn t ]}  (33) 
Notice that Mn% − Mn = ( ) 22
b d t
t
λ π − + +  > 0 by assumption A2, which implies that tying 
induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive content 
available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers.  The first term in 
equation (33) thus represents the net beneficial effects of wider availability of exclusive 
content due to tying.  There are two channels.  First, tying induces all consumers to have 
access to exclusive content for platform A.  Second, the number of consumers who have 
access to exclusive content for platform B also increases.  This can be seen from the 
comparison of  NB  = 
2
b d
t
λ −  and = BN% ( )2
b
t
dλ π+ − .   In addition, non-exclusive content 
providers need to participate in only one platform with tying rather than both ones since 
every consumer on the other side participates in platform A.  The second term represents 
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such cost savings associated with non-duplication of the same content.10  Both effects are 
positive.  However, tying may increase overall “transportation costs”, which is represented 
by the third term.   
Nonetheless, the simple structure of the model yields an unambiguous answer 
concerning the welfare effects of tying.  To see this, I manipulate equation (33) as 
  ∆W = °W − W = ( Mn% − Mn )[[λ (π + b)  − d − t]  + (1 −λ) c  
                        − {[ 1
0
Mn
txdx
−∫ % − [ 10 BN txdx−∫ + 10 AN txdx−∫  ]}  (34) 
The first-term in equation (34) is still positive by assumption A1.  In addition, the 
expression in the curly bracket is negative since Mn% = 
( )
2
b d
t
λ π+ − > 
2
b d
t
λ −  =NA = NB .  
Therefore, ∆W = °W − W > 0, that is, tying is welfare-enhancing in this simple model.   
To explore the role of multi-homing in the model, it is instructive to consider the 
welfare effects of tying in a situation where tying prevents consumers from multi-homing.11  
Without multi-homing, all consumers will use only the tied product in the two-sided market.  
This implies that all content is provided for format A and exclusive content for format B 
will be no longer available.  The welfare level under tying in the absence of multi-homing is 
given by  
 =  π + b − c − d −         (33) °SHW 1
0
txdx∫
                                                 
10 In this sense, tying induces more multi-homing on the consumer side but less multi-homing on the content 
provider side. 
11 This would be the case if the monopolist engages in technical tying in which it designs its product in a way 
that a competitor’s product cannot interoperate with the tying product.  My model suggests that such a practice 
can be anti-competitive. 
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If the marginal costs of serving additional customers are small on both sides (i.e., c ≈ 0, d ≈ 
0) as in the case of digital media systems, I can approximate ∆W = − W as °SHW
 ∆W = − W ≈ °SHW
2( )( )
4 2
b t b tb
t t
λ λπ λ −⎛ ⎞− + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
   < 
2 2( )( )
4 4
b t b tb
t t
λ λπ λ −⎛ ⎞− + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ t  
                                    = ( ) (4 3 )
4
b t b t
t
λ λπ λ−− + − < 0    (34) 
Thus, tying is unambiguously welfare-reducing if multi-homing is not allowed.  This result 
is in sharp contrast to the result obtained with the assumption of multi-homing and 
highlights the importance of explicitly considering the role of multi-homing in the antitrust 
analysis of network industries.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks  
I analyze the effects of tying arrangements on competition in markets with indirect 
network effects by using the framework of two-sided markets.  In particular, I develop a 
model of network competition that explicitly incorporates the possibility of multi-homing.  I 
consider two possible cases, one in which only the content side is allowed to multi-home 
with the consumer side of the market being characterized by exclusive intermediation, and 
the other in which both content providers and final consumers are allowed to participate in 
both platforms.  
My analysis is motivated by the prevailing condition in the digital media market in 
which content providers encode in multiple formats and consumers use multiple media 
players.   Multi-homing has potential to counteract the tendency towards tipping and the 
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lock-in effects in industries with network effects.  As a result, tying does not automatically 
foreclose competing products.  Even in cases where tying leads to the foreclosure of 
competing products as in the model with exclusive intermediation on the consumer side, the 
welfare implications of tying can be subtle and ambiguous.  Therefore, we need be cautious 
in applying the traditional theory of network effects and tipping to two-sided markets.  I 
conclude by mentioning a couple of avenues along which the current analysis can be 
extended. 
 First of all, I have assumed that there is an exogenous amount of exclusive content 
available for each format.  This can be justified if the two platforms are technically 
differentiated and some content is more appropriate for one particular type of technology.  
However, exclusivity can be endogenously created through the use of exclusive contracts.  
A recent paper by Doganoglu and Wright (2006b) analyzes the ability of an incumbent to 
use exclusive contracts to deter entry by a more efficient entrant in a market characterized 
by network effects.  They find that exclusive contracts can be anticompetitive if consumers 
can join only a single firm.  With the possibility of multi-homing, however, they find that 
contracts that only require consumers to commit to purchase from the incumbent is not 
anticompetitive unless they prevent consumers from also buying from the entrant.  In my 
model, an interesting question would be if exclusive contracts can be used by non-tying 
firms to create incentives for consumers to multi-home when the monopolist ties.      
In addition, many network industries are in dynamic and technology-driven high-
tech fields.   Despite the central position innovation occupies in the performance of such 
industries, the model in this paper has been mainly concerned with pricing implications of 
  30/09/06 26
tying in network industries.  One important extension would be to analyze how the 
possibility of multi-homing shapes the incentives to innovate in network industries.   
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